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THE SOURCE OF LAW IN CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS:
SOME OLD LIGHT ON SECTION 1988
SETH

F. KREIMERt

INTRODUCTION

The common lawyer's hallmark is a passion for analogies. Confronted with a new question, she naturally responds by searching for
the way that similar questions have been answered elsewhere. Yet a
federal system, by definition, provides the common lawyer with an embarrassment of riches; in any given case, analogous facts may be found
in each of the state systems as well as the federal courts.
Confronted with the untidy uncertainties of several arguably applicable state law systems, the common lawyer experiences distress.
The distress is often so acute that one federal judge I know maintains
that his most effective technique to encourage settlement in unruly diversity cases is to suggest that the parties brief the choice of law issues.
In federal court actions arising under state law, the distress is
often unavoidable.' One might hope, however, that at least in constitutional litigation-the heartland of the federal judiciary-courts and attorneys could escape the inconvenience of having to juggle more than
one set of laws at a time. Unfortunately, such a hope is unlikely to be
fulfilled, for we live in a system of inescapable federalism.
Current constitutional doctrine makes due process claims turn on
the state's definition of the property rights at issue.' The scope of relief
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. 1974, J.D. 1977,
Yale University. An earlier version of the Article was delivered to the Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in October 1983. Both
the original and subsequent versions have benefited from the helpful comments of my
colleagues Frank Goodman and Steve Burbank and from the invaluable efforts of my
reasearch assistants John Rothchild and Teresa Gillen. All responsibility for errors
remains my own.
I At one time Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), provided hope of assuaging the distress. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), however, ended all of
that.
2 See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978)

(state law prohibition against public utility's "at will" termination of service gives rise
to "a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' within the protection of the Due Process
Clause"); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-74 (1975) (defining fourteenth amendment
property rights on the basis of Ohio law, which created a "legitimate claim of entitlement to a public education"); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)

(stating that property rights "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law").
(601)
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available in state courts may also affect the constitutional claim.3 In
equity doctrine, Pullman abstention" forces federal courts to look over
one shoulder at what state courts might do with the case at hand, while
Younger abstention 5 mandates attention to what the state courts are
doing now.6 In addition, the rediscovered full faith and credit statute7
dictates that federal courts pay attention to what their state colleagues
have already done.8
3 See Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3204 (1984) (finding no property deprivation without due process where the state provides a satisfactory postdeprivation tort
remedy); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432-33 (1982) (determining
the contours of a property right by reference to state law and the procedural sufficiency
of state-granted remedies by reference to federal law and finding that a state
postdeprivation tort remedy does not provide due process where the deprivation" results
from the state's structures); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S 527, 543-44 (1981) (when
property was negligently deprived by state official, state postdeprivation remedy providing for an action against the state rather than its individual employees satisfied due
process requirements).
, Under Pullman abstention, a federal court abstains from decision pending a
determination in state court of difficult and unsettled questions of state law that must
be resolved before deciding a substantial federal constitutional question. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (1984); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415, 427-28 (1979); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 30612 (1979); Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 477, 480-81
(1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1976); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
5 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-46 (1971) (holding that federal courts
should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions except under extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate).
6 The federal courts have extended Younger's concern for "equity, comity and
federalism" so that it no longer simply affects their enjoining of state criminal proceedings. It now seems to bar federal courts from entertaining a variety of actions that are
thought to interfere with pending state proceedings. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 7, 9 (1983) (condemnation proceedings); Middlesex County Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-32, 434-35 (1982) (disciplinary
proceedings against a lawyer); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454
U.S. 100, 107-17 (1981) (proceedings challenging constitutionality of state tax laws);
Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1981) (child custody proceedings); Moore v.
Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 434-35 (1979) (same); Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v.
Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 477-80 (1977) (unemployment benefits appeal proceedings);
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (welfare benefits appeals
proceedings).
7 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) (The "judicial proceedings [of any state court] shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they are taken.").
8 Explicit consideration of the full faith and credit statute was absent from federal
civil rights cases before 1980. For example, in Sweet Briar Inst. v. Button, 387 U.S.
423 (1967) (per curiam), the Supreme Court, in one brief paragraph, reversed a threejudge district court order of abstention. The lower court had abstained because a suit
was pending in the state courts in which the plaintiff had already litigated its federal
claims. See Sweet Briar Inst. v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312, 315-16 (W.D. Va. 1967).
Despite the fact that there was an outstanding state judgment, the Supreme Court
never mentioned § 1738. More recently, however, the Court has made clear that § 1738
applies in § 1983 litigation. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct.
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Each of these areas is the subject of a recognizable, if not coherent,
body of evolving doctrine. In each instance the frequent traveler knows
the landmarks and where to look for further developments, if not where
the developments will lead. This essay, on the other hand, focuses on a
more limited area of interaction between state and federal law in constitutional litigation-an area in which the landmarks are not so well
known. I address the source of law to be used to fill in the outlines of
causes of action under the Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Acts.'
The problem, in short, is this. Laconically drafted over a century
ago as section 1 of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act,' 0 42 U.S.C. § 198311
provides a cause of action to persons deprived of constitutional rights
under color of state law. Beyond providing a right to sue for redress,
however, section 1983 is silent. As a result, it has become a blank canvas upon which the federal courts must sketch the details of a cause of
action against state officials for violations of constitutional rights.
It is not entirely clear how the Supreme Court has chosen to fill
this canvas. References to legislative history as well as to the common
1799, 1802 (1984) (state arbitration proceedings brought pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement do not constitute a "judicial proceeding" under § 1738); Migra v.
Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892, 896-98 (1984) (Section 1738
accords state court judgments preclusive effect in § 1983 suits as to the entire claim and
not only the specific issues litigated in state court.); Haring v. Prosise, 103 S. Ct. 2368,
2373 (1983) (applying state law on preclusion pursuant to § 1738 and determining that
Virginia rules of collateral estoppel did not bar plaintiff's § 1983 action); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (rejecting the view that state court judgments have no
preclusive effect in § 1983 actions). But cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)
(authorizing a permanent injunction under § 1983 against future prosecutions pursuant
to an unconstitutional state statute despite petitioner's unsuccessful litigation of the constitutional defense in state court in past prosecution); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964) (permitting petitioners to return to federal
court to litigate federal constitutional claims despite previous state court proceedings
that adjudicated the same issues).
I This is not to say that this essay traverses a trackless wilderness. The problem of
choice of law and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) has been addressed most prominently by

Professor Eisenberg. See Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The
Proper Scope of Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 499 (1980); see also Eisenberg,
Section 1983: DoctrinalFoundationsand an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REv.
482 (1982). For other paths through the underbrush, see Theis, Shaw v. Garrison:
Some Observations on 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and FederalCommon Law, 36 LA. L. REv.
681 (1976); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5 (1980); Comment,
Choice of Law Under Section 1983, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1970); see also Hill,
ConstitutionalRemedies, 69 CoLuM. L. Rav. 1109 (1969); Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY, L. REv. 725 (1981);

Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of
Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNmEt L. REv. 1011 (1980); Note,
Federalism and FederalQuestions: ProtectingCivil Rights Under the Regime of Swift
v. Tyson, 70 VA. L. REV. 267 (1984).
" Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)).
11 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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law contemporaneous with the statute's adoption abound. Nonetheless,
in elaborating the statutory scheme, recent Supreme Court decisions
have, in most areas, constructed an autonomous federal common law of
constitutional torts.
At the same time that this federal common law approach has carried the field in most areas of civil rights jurisprudence, a separate line
of cases under section 1983 has interpreted another remnant of the Reconstruction Era-originally part of the 1866 Civil Rights Act' 2 and
now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1988' 3-as mandating that local state law
be incorporated to fill the interstices of constitutional tort actions.
Thus far the two lines of cases have remained largely distinct. The
Supreme Court has looked to section 1988 for guidance only in the
areas of statutes of limitations and survival of actions. With respect to
other issues under section 1983, the Court has simply ignored section
1988 in enunciating a federal common law. It is only a matter of time,
however, before the Court will be forced to reconcile these differing
approaches toward section 1988 and reach the question of where the
mandatory incorporation of state law leaves off and the domain of independent federal statutory interpretation begins.
I.

A.

THE PROBLEM

Sources of Law in Civil Rights Cases

Section 1983, the keystone of modern constitutional litigation, declares with majestic simplicity that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . .
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. 4
Although section 1983 obviously provides a cause of action, the
extent and conditions of this liability are entirely unclear. The prob12 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988

(1982)).

13 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). In 1976 Congress appended the civil rights attorney's
fees provision to § 1988. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as the second sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982)). There is no apparent reason for this placement of this provision.
14 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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lematic definition of "color of law"1 5 has bedeviled a generation of constitutional litigators. The difficulties of causation are no more tractable
here than in other areas of tort law. Nor is the substantive scope of
"rights, privileges, or immunities" protected by section 1983 without
difficulty. Once a relevant deprivation has been established, moreover,
courts must find guidance on issues of the measure of damages, available defenses, the applicability of vicarious liability, provisions for contribution, applicable statutes of limitations, the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies, and the burden of proof concerning these
matters. In regard to these matters, section 1983 is silent. The statute
directs that rights be vindicated, yet it fails to erect any remedial
structure.
In the search for guidance on these issues, one might turn first to
the statute's legislative history. But two decades of excursions into the
Congressional Globe of 1871 have convinced most observers that the
legislative history of section 1983 is, in the main, unhelpful. Given the
passions raised by Reconstruction and the breadth of the issues addressed, few lawyers are unable to find support for their position in
those turbulent debates. To take one indicative example, both the abrupt establishment of municipal immunity in Monroe v. Pape6 in
1961 and, seventeen years later, its sudden replacement by a scheme
allowing liability on a showing of a link between the violation and
17
some municipal policy in Monell v. Department of Social Services
rested nominally on readings of legislative history. Both cases, however,
had less to do with new-found insight into the mood of the 1871 Congress than with emerging perceptions of the proper scope of government
responsibility in the twentieth century. If each nuance of the elabora" The majority in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), rejected Justice Frankfurter's argument that an action in violation of state law could not constitute action
under color of state law. See id. at 224-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The Court
relied on the construction it had given to a different Reconstruction Era statute in
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), concluding that "'[m]isuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken "under color of" state law.'"
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184 (quoting Classic, 313 U.S. at 326). Most recently, the Court
has equated the "under color of law" requirement with the fourteenth amendment's
state action requirement. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922
(1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); see also Polk County v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312, 317-19 (1981) (finding that a public defender employed by the county
does not act under color of state law when representing an indigent client because
canons of ethics required that her actions be independent of the wishes of her
employers).
16 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
17 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
18 A close reading of both Monroe and Monell discloses gaping holes at the foundation of their arguments construing legislative history. For a discussion of Monroe, see
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tion of section 1983's remedial structure must be rooted in explicit legEisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 504-15 (1982). For a discussion of Monell, see Schnapper, Civil
Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUm. L. REv. 213 (1979).
The alteration in the Supreme Court's reading of legislative history between
Monroe's municipal immunity and Monell's municipal liability is in fact even sharper
than it appears because Monroe's cursory discussion of the congressional intent to immunize municipalities was forcefully reaffirmed in a four page analysis of the legislative history of § 1983 in a 1973 Supreme Court case. See Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693, 706-710 (1973) ("[1I]t cannot be doubted that the House arrived at the
firm conclusion that Congress lacked the constitutional power to impose liability upon
municipalities.. . . [Wie cannot infer any congressional intent other than to exclude all
municipalities . . . from the civil liability created in . . . § 1983.").
Monell's contrary conclusion five years later was tempered by the discovery of a
legislative intent to impose municipal liability only where the deprivation of rights had
been pursuant to municipal policy. Diligent study of Monell yields a variety of criteria
for determining when a violation is attributable to municipal policy. See Monell, 436
U.S. at 690 ("touchstone" of violation is that "official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights"); id. ("action . . . [that] implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated"); id. at 694 ("official policy as the moving force of the constitutional violation"); id. at 691 (" 'persistent and widespread discriminatory practices'" without formal approval) (quoting
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)) ; id. at 694 n.58 (a "right
to control" combined with "direction . . . exercised" and a "failure to supervise"); id.
at 692-93 n.57 (parallel statutory provision imposing liability for "neglect[ing] or
refusfing]" to protect constitutional rights against known threats).
A closer study of Monell's account of the legislative history, however, reveals no
substantial basis for the role of policy as an element of liability. Lacking referents by
which to construe the newly-minted requirement, the lower courts have wandered aimlessly. Cf Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 771 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(Politz, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for exculpating city as long as "the city's
official substantive policy, as set forth in a written ordinance or as formally adopted by
the city's lawmakers, is facially constitutional"). Compare Rookard v. Health & Hosps.
Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1983) (single act by "official [who] has final authority
over significant matters involving the exercise of discretion" is policy) and McKinley v.
City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 1983) (personnel decision by city manager
constitutes official policy) and Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 1981) (a
"causal nexus" between the valid regulations promulgated by police chief and the deprivation is sufficient), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982) and Pennsylvania v. Porter,
659 F.2d 306, 321 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (knowledge and acquiescence in the deprivation of rights constitutes policy), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982) and Turpin v.
Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 201 (2d Cir.) (official policy exists "where senior personnel have
knowledge of a pattern" of violations "but fail to take remedial steps"), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1016 (1980) with Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444,
451 (6th Cir. 1984) ("single, discrete" personnel decision by school superintendent not
evidence of school district policy) and Bennett, 728 F.2d at 768-69 (requiring actual or
constructive knowledge of continuing objectionable practice on the part of the city's
governing body; "policymaking authority is more than discretion, and it is far more
than the final say-so") and Lopez v. City of Austin, 710 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1983)
("isolated act" by city not policy) and Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 399 (2d Cir.
1983) (policy must be "moving force" behind objectionable actions) and Brewer v.
Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 401 (5th Cir. 1982) (acts of chief of police not policy).
For other examples of the limited role accorded to legislative history in construing
the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act, see, for example, the short shrift given to Justice Marshall's position that for purposes of defining immunities in the 1871 act, it must be
construed in pari materia with the provisions of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which the
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islative discussion, the courts face an impossible task. But this task is
one that the Court has, in fact, eschewed. Although most opinions still
mention the legislative history of section 1983, such references are, in
large measure, ceremonial. More often, neither the debates nor the context of the legislative record can be said to provide solid ground for
decision.
Forsaking the thickets of legislative history, courts interpreting
section 1983 have often attempted to erect a structure of presumptions
based on the law as it stood in 1871. Justice Frankfurter argued in
Tenney v. Brandhove,'9 and subsequent cases have regularly reiterated, 20 that if the Congress had intended to impose liability incommensurate with the common law of 1871, it would have said so. Absent
statements or statutes to the contrary-runs the argument-the nineteenth century law of government immunities, damages, and torts
should govern.2"
But implication from silence is a risky business. 22 Given the unqualified language of section 1983, one might argue with equal force
that had Congress intended to limit the scope of liability it would have
voiced that intention. There is, moreover, some incongruity in suggesting that a statute adopted to redress a failure of existing legal remedies for violations of constitutional rights should be defined by the scope
of those very remedies.23
Nor is the case for the assimilation of the jurisprudence of 1871
compelling on policy grounds. At least Justice Frankfurter's argument
in Tenney for the incorporation of legislative immunity into section
authors and sponsors of the Ku Klux Klan Act regarded as identical, see Briscoe v.
LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 341 n.26 (1983); cf. id. at 356-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting),
and see the historically remarkable assertion that the Ku Klux Klan Act conspiracy
provisions may have been intended to be inapplicable to political conspiracies, see
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352, 3359-60 (1983).
19 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
20 See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1974 (1984); Briscoe v. LaHue,
460 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1983); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,
263-64 (1981); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-19 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316-18
(1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 244 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,

554-55 (1967).
21 See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376; cases cited supra note 20.
22 Cf R. BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONs 87-88 (1960).
23 See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 349 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It might be appropriate to import common-law defenses and immunities into the
statute if, in enacting § 1983, Congress had merely sought to federalize state tort law
... . [But] [d]ifferent considerations surely apply when a suit is based on a federally
guaranteed right . . . ."); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 196 n.5 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("It
would indeed be the purest coincidence if the state remedies for violations of commonlaw rights by private citizens were fully appropriate to redress those injuries which
only a state official can cause and against which the Constitution provides protection.").
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1983 was bolstered by contentions regarding the continued centrality of
legislative immunity to the democratic process"' and by Justice Frankfurter's professed doubt regarding the constitutional ability of Congress
to impose liability. 26 In contrast, in some recent cases the Court has
treated section 1983 as automatically incorporating by reference all of
the answers found in the law of 1871.
This increasing attention to contemporaneous common law has
generated a boom in law-office history2" in recent Terms. The pages of
the U.S. Reports fill with the smoke of battle over how many of the
thirty-seven states in 1871 required intent as opposed to recklessness as
an element of the case for punitive damages,2" over whether an action
against a police officer for testifying falsely and thereby denying due
process is more closely analogous to the nineteenth century action of
defamation or to the common law writ of crimen feloniae imposuit,2"
and over whether a federal injunction against a magistrate who insists
on incarcerating defendants charged with nonjailable offenses pending
trial is properly analogized to prerogative writs issued by the King's
Bench against the ecclesiastical courts in 1691.29 In similar fashion the
Court has disavowed the power to "establish immunities from section
1983 actions in the interests of what we judge to be sound public policy" and denied immunity to public defenders "because there was, of
course, no such office or position in existence at that time." 30
24

See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377-78.

25

See id. at 376.

1 borrow "law-office history" from Professor Kelly. See Kelly, Clio and the
Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 119, 122 n.13 (describing law-office
history as "the selection of data favorable to the position being advanced without regard
to or concern for contradictory data or proper evaluation of the relevance of the data
proffered").
17 Compare Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 41 (1983) ("[T]he rule in a large majority of jurisdictions was that punitive damages ... could be awarded without a showing
of actual ill will, spite, or intent to injure.") with id. at 68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority relies on decisions from the late nineteenth century that
"unambiguously support an actual malice standard").
28 Compare Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-31 n.9 (1983) (finding that a
common law immunity insulated witnesses from subsequent damages liability for testimony and that the common law action for false accusation is inapplicable under the
circumstances) with id. at 350-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that common law
immunities would not bar an action based on malicious prosecution or crimenfeloniae
imposuit).
20 Compare Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1974-75 (1984) (analogizing relief
afforded at common law by prerogative writs to the injunction sought in the case at
hand) with id. at 1987 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's reliance
upon common law application of prerogative writs is misplaced in that "the unique
relationship between the King's Bench and England's ecclesiastical courts. . . finds no
parallel in this country").
30 Tower v. Glover, 104 S. Ct. 2820, 2825 (1984). The Court noted that the
English barrister, the most analogous position to public defenders in existence in 1871,
26
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In contrast to the Court's claims of fidelity to the common law as
it stood in 1871, from early in its development constitutional tort doctrine in fact looked to modern policy as decisive. Nearly twenty years
ago, in Pierson v. Ray,3 1 Chief Justice Warren referred to modern
rather than nineteenth century tort doctrine in defining the scope of
good faith immunities under section 1983.32 Warren relied on the "prevailing view" of the good faith immunity of law enforcement officials
under the common law as it stood in 1967, citing Restatement (Second)
of Torts and The Law of Torts by Harper & James,3 3 although the
scope of official immunity in the nineteenth century may well have
been considerably narrower than the good faith immunity accorded by
any branch of current doctrine.34
Expansions and refinements of section 1983 immunities have continued this trend away from reliance upon nineteenth century tort
law.3 5 Immunity doctrine under section 1983, moreover, has increasenjoyed no immunity. See id.
S1 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
32 See id. at 555.
32 See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 121 (1965); 1 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.18, at 277-78 (1956)).
See, e.g., Tratcy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80, 95 (1836) (no good faith
defense if offending action is "clearly against law"). Moreover, the development of immunity doctrine has apparently overruled sub silentio the earlier determination in Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 378 (1915), affig Anderson v. Myers, 182 F. 223, 22930 (C.C.D. Md. 1910), that official bad faith need not be shown in order to recover
damages under § 1983:
[T]here can be no right action under the fifteenth amendment and these
sections . . . unless the discrimination and denial was in pursuance of a
state law. Therefore, if the defendants' contention could be upheld, the
defendant in such a suit could always plead that he did not act ... in bad
faith, because he was acting in obedience to the laws of the state.
The common sense of the situation would seem to be that . . . any
one who does enforce [an unconstitutional law] does so at his known peril
and is made liable to an action for damages by the simple act of enforcing
a void law to the injury of the plaintiff. . ,and no allegation of malice
need be alleged or proved.
Anderson, 182 F. at 229-30. See also Brickhouse v. Brooks, 165 F. 534, 543 (C.C.E.D.
Va. 1908) ("It was not necessary that the plaintiff should allege in his declaration that
the defendants in rejecting his vote acted either maliciously or intentionally wrongful
[sic]. The statute under which the plaintiff proceeded does not so require, and the rules
of pleading applicable to common-law suits . . . do not apply to this action.").
" For example, this trend is evident in the areas of prosecutorial immunity, see
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421-22 (1976) (first American case establishing
prosecutorial immunity was not until 1896), and municipal immunity, see Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 644-47 (1980) (rejecting sovereign/proprietary
distinction for municipal immunity, concededly prevalent at common law, because of
current trend toward rejection of that doctrine). But cf. id at 676-77 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court must look to the sovereign/proprietary distinction as it
existed when § 1983 was enacted, while recognizing that most states now use new
criteria for ascertaining the scope of municipal liability).
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ingly become divorced from any body of law outside of federal civil
rights cases. The Court elaborates doctrines conferring quasi-legislative
immunity on judicial and regional administrators,3 6 quasi-judicial immunity on administrative officials, 3 7 and administrative liability on judicial officials, 8 without references to either the common law of 1871
or, for that matter, of the twentieth century.
A recent and revealing example of Court-created civil rights law
was the elimination, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,39 of the requirement of
subjective good faith as a prerequisite for official immunity. Not only
did the Supreme Court fail to examine the law of 1871 on the point,
but it enunciated the alteration of section 1983 immunity in the context
of a federal common law action grounded directly on the first amendment.40 After a "balancing of competing values" as a matter of federal
common law, to which the intent of the 1871 Congress was entirely
irrelevant, the Court announced a new test for official immunity. 4 ' Acknowledging that no issue under section 1983 was before it, the Court,
without elaborating, incorporated the new test into the jurisprudence of
section 1983 in a footnote.42 This incorporation cannot be read as mere
dictum, for last Term, in Davis v. Scherer,4 -a case brought under
section 1983-the Court relied on Harlow and the federal common law
decision in Butz v. Economou44 to elaborate this immunity doctrine
without reference to the history or context of section 1983.48 In light of
" See Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731-34 (1980) (holding
Virginia court and its members immune from suit when promulgating a disciplinary
code for attorneys and thus acting in a legislative capacity); Lake Country Estates, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 402-06 (1979) (extending legislative immunity to regional administrators when acting in legislative capacity).
"' See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-16 (1978) (granting absolute immunity from suit to administrators who perform functions analogous to that of a judge or
prosecutor).
38 See Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 736 (1980) (refusing to
extend absolute immunity to the Virginia court and its members when acting in their
enforcement capacity); see also Consumers Union v. Virginia State Bar, 688 F.2d 218,
221-22 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding Virginia State Bar, in addition to the Virginia court,
liable for its role in enforcing the disciplinary rules at issue).
39 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
40 See id. at 813-19.
4' See id. at 816.
42 See id. at 818 n.30 ("[Ilt would be 'untenable to draw a distinction for purposes
of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits
brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials.' "; quoting Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
43 104 S. Ct. 3012 (1984).
44 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
45 Scherer, 104 S. Ct. at 3108. Scherer's determination that an action taken in
violation of state regulations can be in good faith, see id. at 3019-20, is itself arguably a
novel expansion of § 1983 immunities. Earlier cases had premised the immunity on the
official's acting within the sphere of her responsibilities, and the policy balance under-
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this development, it is clear that what the Court undertakes in most
immunities cases is not a search for century-old legislative intent or
common law context but the enunciation of a federal common law that
the Court regards as appropriate to modern social and political
realities.
This analysis is not unique to immunities issues. With respect to
the calculation of damages, the Court has decided that "over the centuries the common law of torts has developed a set of rules to implement
the principle that a person should be compensated fairly" and that
these rules are the "starting point for the inquiry."4 In the absence of
a specific statutory mandate, the Court "look[s] first to the common law
of torts (both modern and as of 1871), with such modification or adaptation as might be necessary to carry out the purpose and policy of the
statute."4 The Court has apparently decided to incorporate a proximate cause test into section 1983 as a matter of federal common law.'8
And it is perhaps most accurate to characterize the doctrine limiting
municipal damage liability to violations pursuant to municipal policy4 9
as an evolving common law quasi-immunity that will be developed and
elaborated on a case-by-case basis as courts gain experience with the
doctrine.
B.

The Dissonance of Section 1988

After issues of immunities, damages, and municipal liability, the
most frequently litigated question of law in section 1983 actions may
well be that of the applicable statute of limitations.5" Because section
1983 contains no more mention of statutes of limitations than of immunities or damage calculations, one might expect the Court to employ the
lying the doctrine generally presumes that officials should be protected in their attempts
to implement state interests. If the interest is disavowed by regulation or statute, it is
difficult to see why the public interest requires that officials be given discretion to violate constitutional rights.
48 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978).
' Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983). The Court recognized in Wade that
the law of 1871 is relevant to the inquiry, but it believed that the intent of Congress
was to "incorporate applicable general legal principles as they evolve." Id. at 34 n.2.
48 See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980) ("[A]ppellants' decedent's
death is too remote a consequence of the parole officers' action to hold them responsible
under the federal civil rights law.").
49 See Monnell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. But see supra note 18 (discussion of difficulty of defining municipal policy).
50 See, e.g., Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S.Ct. 2924 (1984); Chardon v. Fumero Soto,
103 S.Ct. 2611 (1983); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980); Garcia v.
Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 79 (1984); Knoll v. Springfield Township School Dist., 699 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S.Ct.
3571 (1984).
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federal common law process described above to govern this area as well.
In the statute of limitations cases, however, as in the field of survival of
actions, the Supreme Court does not view this question as a matter of
federal common law but as an issue governed by section 1988, the
choice of law provision incorporated into the ancestor of section 1983
itself.5 1
Section 1983 was originally a part of section 1 of the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871.52 In addition to creating a cause of action for the
"1See Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2928 (1984) ("Congress has directed
federal courts to follow a three step process to borrow an appropriate rule."); id. at
2931 n.14 (rejecting approach of DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462
U.S. 151 (1983), which looked to the importance of uniformity in federal common
law); Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611, 2618 (1983) ("Congress has specifically directed the courts, in the absence of state law, to apply state statute of limitations
and state tolling rules . . . ."); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980)
(under § 1988 federal courts "obligated not only to apply the analogous [state] statute
of limitations . . . but also to apply the [state] rule for tolling"); Moor v. County of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 701-02 n.12 (1973) ("[T]his is a wholly different case from
those in which, lacking any clear expression of congressional will, we have been called
upon to decide whether it is appropriate to look to state law or to fashion a single
federal rule in order to fill the interstices of federal law."); cf Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14, 24 n.11 (1980) (§ 1988's command does not apply to federal common law
actions grounded in an implied constitutional right pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
Fed. Narcotic Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584,
594 n.11 (1978) ("[W]hatever the value of nationwide uniformity in areas . . . where
Congress has not spoken, in the areas to which § 1988 is applicable Congress has
provided direction, indicating that state law will often provide the content of the federal
remedial rule.").
This approach represents a change from the earlier Supreme Court interpretations
that seemed to read § 1988 as simply declarative of authority to enunciate federal common law. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969)
("[A]s we read § 1988, . . . both federal and state rules on damages may be utilized,
whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes."); see also Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976) (citing federal common law cases to justify
borrowing state statutes of limitations in civil rights action, without mentioning §
1988); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975) (borrowing state
statute of limitations as a matter of common law and relying on other federal common
law cases; citing § 1988 for the proposition that there is nothing "peculiar to a federal
civil rights action that would justify special reluctance in applying state law"); Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 231 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing, inter alia, Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 238-40) ("Standards governing the granting of relief under § 1983 are to be developed by the federal courts in
accordance with the purposes of the statute and as a matter of federal common law.");
cf. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 479 (1979) (characterizing Johnson and Robertson
as cases that are illustrative of federal common law policies); United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (similar case).
News of this alteration in approach appears not to have reached some courts and
treatise writers. See Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (characterizing § 1988 as codifying general federal common law approach); C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4514, at
264-66 (1982) (treating statute of limitations issues in § 1983 cases as matters of federal common law, without mentioning § 1988).
52 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
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violation of federal constitutional rights, section 1 provided for federal
jurisdiction over the civil actions it authorized, a grant made necessary
by the absence of general federal question jurisdiction.5 3 As part of a
series of Reconstruction statutes stretching from 1866 to 1875, the Ku
Klux Klan Act incorporated by reference the procedures adopted by the
Civil Rights Act of 1866"4 to govern federal civil rights actions. 5
The entire body of civil rights statutes was reorganized and codified in the Revised Statutes of 1875. One element of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act became section 722 of the Revised Statutes,56 which was
drafted to govern all remaining civil rights actions, both civil and criminal. Recodified as section 1988, section 722 is the statute to which the
Supreme Court looks in deciding statute of limitations questions in ac57
tions brought pursuant to the Reconstruction Statutes.
It is worth reproducing section 1988 in extenso to remind readers
of the full scope of its obscurity:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on
the district courts by the provisions of this Title, and of Title
"CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES," for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights,
and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in
1985 (1982)).
CCongress did not create such jurisdiction until 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, §
1, 18 Stat. 470 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)); see also C. WRIGHT, THE LAW
OF ThE FEDERAL COURTS 90

(4th ed. 1983).

Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982, 1988 (1982)).
, Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act provided that
[s]uch proceeding [is] to be prosecuted in the several district and circuit
courts of the United States, with and subject to the same right of appeal,
review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such
courts, under the provisions of [the Civil Rights Act of 18661 and the other
remedial laws which are in their nature applicable in such cases.
Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13.
56 Ch. 12, § 722, 18 Stat. 134, 137 (1875).
" The Court views § 1988 as governing choice of law in actions brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) and 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982) as well as those under § 1983. See
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976) (stating that it is federal policy to adopt
the local statute of limitations where Congress has been silent and applying this principle to an action brought under § 1981); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S.
454, 462-64 (1975) (applying state statute of limitations in § 1981 action pursuant to §
1988); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969) (holding that compensatory damages for the deprivation of a federal right in a § 1982 action are governed by federal standards, pursuant to § 1988's mandate to look to the laws of the
United States first); see also Burnett v. Gratton, 104 S. Ct. 2924 (1984) (alleging
causes of action under §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985). For a more extensive discussion of the
pedigree of § 1988, see Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The
ProperScope of Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 499 (1980).
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conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such
laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all
cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies
and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the
infliction of punishment on the party found guilty. 8
The Supreme Court has informed us that in section 1988 "Congress ha[s] plainly instructed the federal courts to refer to state law
when federal law provides no rule of decision . . . ." Where state law
applies, says the Court, such law is to be treated as "binding rules of
law," which the federal courts are "obligated . . to apply." 60
Indeed, so forceful is the Court's reading of a mandate to apply
state law to statute of limitations questions that recently, in Chardon v.
Fumero Soto,61 it disregarded the existence of a clearly-established federal rule regarding tolling in class action practice and applied the local
rules instead. 2 The state rule may be disregarded only if it is "incon63
sistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."
This is, in isolation, a plausible reading of the words of section
1988. In practice, however, we confront an anomaly. If section 1988
requires deference to state law in the absence of governing federal
rules,6 4 it would seem that each time a federal court encounters a situa42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (attorneys' fees provision omitted).
5 Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 103 S.Ct. 2611, 2616 (1983).
60 Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980).
56

61

103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983).

See id. at 2618-19 (looking to Puerto Rican tolling rule that allows the limitations period to begin running anew at the time of class decertification, despite the arguably applicable federal rule in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538
(1974), pursuant to which the tolling would have had the effect of suspending the limitations period).
63 Id. at 2619 ("Congress has decided that § 1983 class actions brought in different States, like individual actions under § 1983, will be governed by differing statutes of
limitations and differing rules regarding tolling and tolling effect unless those State
rules are inconsistent with federal law."). The Court also addressed this part of the §
1988 inquiry in Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978), in which it rejected the
claim that Louisiana's survivorship statute was inconsistent with the federal policies
underlying § 1983. See id. at 590-93.
" And, apparently, governing federal rules do not include either the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, compare Chardon, 103 S.Ct. at 2618-19 (rejecting in § 1983
62
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tion not covered by the terms of section 1983, it should survey the entire field of potentially applicable state law, choose the appropriate
state rule, and measure it against the Constitution and laws of the
United States.65 One rule of law may be applicable in New Jersey,
another in Texas, and a third in Minnesota. The jurisprudence of section 1983 would resemble a patchwork quilt laboriously constructed in
each of the fifty states.
Yet, as we have seen, in addressing the important questions of
damages and immunities, the federal courts appear to establish rules of
decision in section 1983 cases as a matter of federal common law without even a passing reference to the state rules to which section 1988 is
thought to direct attention. As the Supreme Court continues to resolve
open issues, a substantial degree of national uniformity increasingly
prevails. How can this state of affairs coexist with a statute that directs
federal courts to treat state rules as "binding rules of law" in civil
rights cases?
On the other hand, one might just as plausibly ask why section
1988 should be read as mandating the binding nature of state law. The
tortuous syntax of the statute, read in light of its opaque legislative
history, 6 leaves substantial room for interpretation. And there is but a
limited case to be made for local experimentation with the protection of
civil rights under a federal statute.6 7 Yet the Court in recent Terms, in
action the application of an analogous federal tolling rule that governed antitrust actions) with id. at 2619-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (interpreting Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 to mandate a tolling rule applicable not only to antitrust class actions, but all class actions), or survival practices under analogous federal statutes, see
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (rejecting Fifth Circuit's approach
in Shaw v. Garrison, 545 F.2d 980, 985 (5th Cir. 1977), which relied on federal courts'
allowance of survival in areas such as maritime law and antitrust law, where federal
statutes were also silent as to the limitation periods).
65 Courts have used § 1988 as a basis for determining the source of law in civil
rights actions to address issues of contribution among tortfeasors, see Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 1759, 1761 (5th Cir. 1983), modified on reh'g, 725 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir.
1984); Miller v. Apartments and Homes of N.J., Inc., 646 F.2d 101, 105 (3d Cir.
1981); Johnson v. Rogers, 621 F.2d 300, 304 n.6 (8th Cir. 1980); survival of actions,
see Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977 (11th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3085 (1983); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 405
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961); tolling of statutes of limitations, see
Chardon, 103 S.Ct. at 2618-19; Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980);
Cramer v. Crutchfield, 648 F.2d 943, 945 (4th Cir. 1981); vicarious liability, see Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1971); punitive damages, see McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907, 911 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 394 (1983);
Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 899 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 85 (1983);
available defenses, see Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208, 1220 (10th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 85 (1983); and prejudgment interest, see Furtado v. Bishop, 604
F.2d 80, 97 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980).
11 See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 501-25.
67 In his dissent in Chardon, Justice Rehnquist has instructed us that "[flew ar-
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resigned deference to what is apparently regarded as the inscrutable
will of Congress, 68 has foresworn the virtues of a uniform federal rule
in areas in which it reads section 1988 as governing the choice of law.
This resignation is problematic, for the alleged congressional intent is anomalous. Not only is it difficult to provide persuasive justifications for deference to state law as the basis for the rules of federal civil
rights actions today, but such deference is also questionable in light of
section 1988's historical context. It requires an incongruous historical
vision to picture the Reconstruction Congress establishing the local law
of the recently-rebelling states as the linchpin of an avowedly nationalist enforcement program.
As originally adopted, section 1988 formed a part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,69 a statute that, as Justice Marshall has reminded
us, "was the first federal statute to provide broad protection in the field
eas of the law stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily applied rules than does the
subject of periods of limitations. A single, uniform federal rule of tolling would provide
desirable certainty to both plaintiffs and defendants .... " Chardon, 462 U.S. at
2619-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14 (1980), on the other hand, suggests that values of federalism support the
variation in protection of civil rights from official action from state to state. See id. at
48 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Brennan's majority opinion contains
the statement that "it makes some sense to allow aspects of § 1983 litigation to vary
according to the laws of the States under whose authority § 1983 defendants work." Id.
at 24 n.11.
These latter statements are baffling, in the context of a statute whose purpose is to
provide a supplementary federal remedy, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183
(1961), unless the suggestion is that states should be free to increase the scope of § 1983
liability beyond the uniform federal minimum. Compare Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc.
v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982) (enunciating federal rules for parens
patriae standing) with Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 318-319 (3d Cir. 1981)
(en banc) (allowing parens partriae standing for state under § 1988 incorporation of
Pennsylvania law, although the existence of federal standing was at best dubious), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
8 See, e.g., Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2931 n.14 (1984) ("Congress, for
whatever reason, sees no need for national uniformity in all aspects of civil rights
cases."); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 594 n.11 (1978) ("[W]hatever the
value of nationwide uniformity in areas of civil rights enforcement where Congress has
not spoken, in the areas to which § 1988 is applicable Congress has provided direction,
• . .[which] obviously means that there will not be nationwide uniformity on these
issues."), quoted with approval in Chardon, 103 S. Ct. 2616 n.9; Board of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 489 (1980).
It is of interest to note that the Court's earliest consideration of the statute of
limitations issue in the context of a § 1983 action relied not on § 1988 but on a nowdiscredited line of cases that saw the applicability of state statutes of limitations as
based on the Rules of Decision Act. See O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322 (1914)
(citing McLaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 158 (1905); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S.
610, 614 (1895)).
6 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1982)).
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of civil rights."" 0 The purpose of the Civil Rights Act was to "guarantee the newly emancipated Negro equality with whites before the
law,"" and its means included provisions for direct federal military intervention, 2 removal of cases from hostile state courts,"3 direct civil actions under the newly-conferred civil jurisdiction,"4 and the establishment of federal criminal penalties, along with federal enforcement
mechanisms against those who denied others equal rights under color of
state law."5 As was true of other weapons of Reconstruction, the Civil
6
Rights Act "was aimed directly at the State judiciary.""1
This aim was well warranted. During Reconstruction the judiciary of former confederate states served both as a means of resisting and
harassing federal officials"" and as a way of attempting to reestablish
white hegemony over the recently emancipated Negro." In the early
period of Reconstruction, occupying federal forces responded by establishing parallel judiciary systems, in the form of Army provost courts
and Freedman's Bureau courts, to provide more sympathetic forums. 79
By 1866, however, the emphasis had begun to shift to establishing more
permanent federal forums by providing access to federal circuit and district courts.8 In this context it seems unlikely that the local common
law elaborated by the very judiciary that the federal courts were
designed to supersede was to be given primacy.
So, too, the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which contained the pred70

Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 358 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

71

Id.

72

See Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 9, 14 Stat. 27, 29 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §

1988 (1982)).
71 Id., ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
74

Id.

"

Id., ch. 31, §§ 2-6, 14 Stat. 27, 27-28.
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 359 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting

76

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 1155 (1866) (statement of Rep. Eldridge)).
77 See H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 322-27 (1982); S. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER
AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 148-50 (1968).
11 See L. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG, THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 282-88 (1979); Westwood, GettingJusticefor the Freedman, 16 How. L.J. 492,

503 (1971).

71 See D. NIEMAN, To SET THE LAW IN MOTION, THE FREEDMAN'S BUREAU
AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868, at 8-11 (1979); Westwood, supra

note 78, at 498-502.
80

For a review of legislation providing for removal of actions from state to federal

courts, see The Removal of Causes from State to Federal Courts, 9 AM. L. REG. 1
(new series 1870). It appears that one of the purposes of the 1866 legislation that
contained § 1988 was to provide a sympathetic judicial forum to replace the military
and Freedman's Bureau courts that were being obstructed by President Johnson. See
D. NIEMAN, supra note 79, at 103-48.

618

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 133:601

ecessor of section 1983,81 was crafted to provide an alternative to a hostile and ineffective state judiciary.82 The Act provides that civil actions
for violations of constitutional rights are "to be prosecuted . . . with

and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other
remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under [the 1866 Civil
Rights Act] and the other remedial laws of the United States which are
in their nature applicable in such cases."83 But this is hardly a clearcut congressional mandate that remedies are to vary from state to state
in accord with the practices of the local judiciary. If a more plausible
interpretation is available, both historical and practical considerations
support its adoption.
II.

REMEMBERING HISTORY

A. A First Look
In fact, such an interpretation is available with the recognition of a
single historical fact: section 1988 was originally enacted more than
seventy years before Erie Railroadv. Tompkins.8 4 In light of this recollection, section 1988 can be parsed as follows. Congress directs courts
in civil rights cases to begin by looking at the "laws of the United
States," and under Swift v. Tyson,8 5 the "laws" of the several states
were thought to comprise primarily their statutes.8" If the federal statSee Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13.
82

See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) ("It is abundantly clear that one

reason the legislation was passed was to
by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect,
be enforced . .
").
8' Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, §
84 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
85 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
88 See, e.g., Theis, supra note 9,

afford a federal right in federal courts because,
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not
1, 17 Stat. 13, 13.

at 684 n.18 (citing Justice Story's opinion in

Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19, for the proposition that "laws" refers to statutes or
"long-established" customs rather than judicial decisions). Professor Eisenberg writes at
length to discuss what kind of "deficiency" in federal law must serve as a predicate to
trigger § 1988 choice of law principles. See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 508-15. Dominant in this analysis is an inquiry into what the words "laws of the United States"
imply. Eisenberg considers four possible interpretations of "laws" in this context: (1)
all federal statutory law, (2) only the particular federal statute creating the cause of
action (typically § 1983), (3) the federal statute creating the cause of action and its
legislative history as it speaks, or does not speak, to the issue in question, and (4)
federal common law. In rejecting the last alternative, Eisenberg declines to read § 1988
in light of Swift in part because of the nature of the general common law that he views
Swift as authorizing, see infra note 109 and accompanying text, and in part because he
views the incorporation of federal common law into § 1988 as untenable because it
would render § 1988 meaningless, see Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 513-14 (asserting
that, if "laws" are to include a federal common law, "federal law will never be deficient, state law will never apply, and section 1988's choice-of-law provision will deteri-
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utes are not "adapted" or are "deficient"-if there is no controlling
statutory rule-a court should look to "the common law, as modified
and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State" in which the
court sits.
Note that section 1988 does not say "the common law of the state"
in question but "the common law." The Reconstruction Congress lived
in the era of Swift and, as Justices Brandeis and Holmes told us, Swift
rests upon the assumption that there is "a transcendental
body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory
within it unless and until changed by statute," that federal
courts have the power to use their judgment as to what the
rules of common law are; and that in the federal courts, "the
parties are entitled to an independent judgment on matters of
general law" ...

.87

Federal courts were wont to expound the common law in diversity
cases, and section 1988 is explicit statutory authority to do the same in
the newly-created civil rights jurisdiction. As noted above, in elaborating the infrastructure of civil rights enforcement under section 1983,
the Supreme Court refers ultimately either to principles of tort law
distilled from contemporary precedents and commentary or to the common law evolution of its own recent cases, influenced by the felt necessities of the time. The Supreme Court need not be embarrassed in
adopting this approach, for, under the interpretation of section 1988
advanced here, the Reconstruction Congress has made good any want
of authority in the Rules of Decision Act, 88 and there is no lack of
constitutional warrant to legislate under the fourteenth amendment.8 9
Nor is the Court tied to the common law of 1871. Under Swift,
courts sitting in diversity acknowledged the necessity of the evolution of
the common law.9" And, far from establishing a clear congressional
orate into nonsense"). This rejection of the fourth alternative is, in fact, consistent with
Swift's own equation of "laws" with "statutes.". Whatever the merits of Eisenberg's
observations in the context of interpreting § 1988's deficiency test, however, his rejection of federal common law as a source of law under § 1988 fails to come to grips with

the issues raised by this essay regarding the nature of the "common law" in § 1988.
8 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
88 Rules of Decision Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 944 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1652 (1982)).
88 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
o See The Extent to Which the Common Law Is Applied in Determining What
Constitutes a Crime, and the Nature and Degree of Punishment Consequent Thereupon, 6 AM. L. REG. 65, 73-74, 79 (1866) ("The nature of the common law is to be
accomodated to the condition, exigencies, and conveniences of the people ... as those
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mandate that rights and remedies under the civil rights statutes vary
from state to state, this reading of section 1988 suggests that the norm
is uniformity. In areas not directly governed by federal statute, a uniform "general common law" should be the centerpiece of enforcement.
Only local statutes and state constitutions impinge on the otherwise uniform body of federal civil rights law. Section 1988 instructs
federal courts to apply the general common law, as modified by local
statutes. This in turn explains the particularly deferential treatment accorded to statutes of limitations and survival statutes. In the cases treating state law as binding, the Supreme Court has deferred to local statutes, pursuant to the mandate of section 1988."' In cases announcing
federal common law, on the other hand, no state statute applies."2
Finally, even where state statutes appear to modify the common
law, a court must still evaluate whether that modification is inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Not content with
establishing a general common law parallel to the diversity law as the
fulcrum of civil rights enforcement, the Reconstruction Congress was
aware of the possibility that state statutory modifications adopted by
exigencies and conveniences insensibly grow upon the people. . . . 'It is one of its excellencies that it is capable of change, of modification, of adapting itself to new situations and varying times'

. . .

.") (quoting 5 LAW

TRACTS

21, 22). Compare Baltimore

& O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927) ("[Wlhen [a standard of conduct] is
clear it should be laid down once for all by the Courts.") with Pokora v. Wabash Ry.,
292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934) (modifying the rule laid down "once for all" in Goodman and
noting that "[sitandards of conduct are declared at times by courts, but they are taken
over from facts of life").
91See, e.g., Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 2929 (1984); Board of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 486 (1980); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593
(1978). It is not clear, however, whether the Puerto Rican tolling rule adopted in
Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 103 S.Ct. 2611, 2618-19 (1983), should be characterized as
a construction of Puerto Rico's statute or as a rule of common law.
92 In the immunities area, for example, the Court neither mentions § 1988, nor
comments on the existence or, in most cases, the nonexistence of state statutes. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Scherer, 104 S.Ct. 3012 (1984); Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S.Ct. 1970 (1984);
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, 446
U.S. 719 (1980); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Imbler v.
Pachman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). The Court has also looked to federal common law, again in
the absence of applicable state statutes, to calculate appropriate damages under § 1983.
See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
Judge Wright of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has recently attempted to develop another scheme to delimit the realm of cases in which the borrowing
of state law is required. In United States v. Brown, 742 F.2d 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(en bane), Judge Wright declared that federal law is deficient only when it fails to
provide some element "universally understood to be .

.

.essential to fair litigation

. ..

Id. at 1506. His effort, however, appears to ignore the peculiarities of § 1988, see
supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text, and is inconsistent with both the holding
and the reasoning in Robertson v. Wegman, 436 U.S. 584 (1978), that federal law is
deficient whenever there is no directly dispositive federal statute.
."
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the same legislatures that promulgated the Black Codes might prove
inimical to effective vindication of federal rights. Congress thus provided a federal veto of such inconsistent provisions; they would be
93
treated as ineffective, and general common law would govern.
This interpretation has the virtue of being consistent with the
words of section 1988, current practice under section 1983, and the
statute's historical context.9 4 It has, moreover, the advantage of leaving
opportunities for federal courts to craft sensible and uniform solutions
to contemporary problems based on contemporary values. The question
remains, however, is it correct?
11 This interpretation avoids the embarrassment that would attend a "state common law" interpretation in determining where courts should look if federal law is not
adopted and state law is inconsistent.
Such supersession of state statutes also may explain City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), in which the Court made no mention of any state
statute and relied instead on federal common law, despite an amicus's suggestion that
the Court apply a state statute that would have foreclosed the availability of punitive
damages against municipalities, see Amicus Curiae Brief of the City of Santa Ana,
California, in Support of Petitioners at 27-28, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247 (1981). See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980) (state
statutory immunity does not govern § 1983 action). Arguably, this may also explain
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 706 (1973) (state statute imposing vicarious liability on counties not followed in § 1983 action because Congress affirmatively
intended to exclude municipal liability under § 1983, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961)). The remainder of Marshall's discussion in Moor of § 1988 is opaque but
could be interpreted as a procedural reading of § 1988. See infra note 96.
" Two other historical interpretations are possible. Professor Eisenberg has argued at length that § 1988 was designed to apply only to cases initially brought under
state law, usually those removed from state to federal court. See Eisenberg, supra note
57, at 525-43. As an interpretation of the 1866 predecessor, this position is plausible,
although it rests on the assumption that the second sentence of § 3 of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act refers to only half of the first sentence. See Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3,
14 Stat. 27, 27. As an interpretation of the 1875 Revised Statutes, however, it is at war
with the text, for Revised Statutes § 722 applies by its terms to a variety of federal
causes of action. In any event, Professor Eisenberg's interpretation appears to have
been rejected by the Supreme Court, although in this area, nothing is final.
The other possibility is to view § 1988 not as a mutated version of the Rules of
Decision Act, but as an early draft of the Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat.
196, 197, which applied to bring federal procedure into line with contemporary rather
than historical state practice. This approach has some support in contemporaneous interpretations. See In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 296, 299 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 13,563)
("[Section 1988] manifestly has reference not to the extent or scope of jurisdiction, or to
the rules of decision, but to the forms of process and remedy."). Moreover, this approach would explain why § 1988 is never cited as controlling the choice of law in
early cases under the Civil Rights Act, see, e.g., O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318
(1914); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897), and why § 1988 by its terms applies only
to cases brought in federal court, see Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229,
256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). However, this approach would also require the
overruling of the corpus of modern Supreme Court cases interpreting § 1988. But ef
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976) (choosing statute of limitations in case
governed by § 1988 in light of congressional silence and quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946)).

622

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 133:601

Remembering History More Carefully

The interpretation set forth above is consistent with current judicial practice and with intimations in a number of Supreme Court cases
interpreting section 1988. 95 Nonetheless, some authorities have rejected
reference to the common law of Swift as not only antiquarian but inaccurate. 6 Although decidedly mixed, the historical record on balance ap' The earliest Supreme Court discussion on the subject, Justice Clifford's dissent
in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879), characterized § 1988 as "a mere jumble of
Federal law, common law, and State Law," requiring the judge to choose among "three
systems of ... jurisprudence." Id. at 299 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Although the methodology of choice was not obvious, in the minds of these dissenters, the common law
referred to is clearly a general common law, rather than the local law of an individual
state. Similarly, in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), Justice Marshall
interpreted § 1988 to mandate reference to "principles of the common law, as altered
by state law." Id. at 702-03, quoted with approval in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 185 (1976). And in Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978), Justice Marshall's opinion noted the possibility of interpreting the common law as either the law of
the forum state or as "the kind of general common law that was an established part of
our federal jurisprudence by the time of § 1988's passage." Id. at 589 n.5. See also
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 85-86 n.10 (3d Cir. 1965) (section 1988 retains vestiges
of Swift); Theis, supra note 9, at 684 (section 1988 "seems to state the Swift rule");
Note, supra note 9, at 276 (Section 1988 directs courts "to apply the common law, as
modified by the particular state's constitution and statutes . . ").
" See H. HYMAN AND W. WIECEK, supra note 77, at 415 (interpreting the common law in § 1988 as "the common law of the forum state"); Eisenberg, supra note 57,
at 517 ("If . . . section 1988 refers to the general common law that existed when
section 1988's precursor was enacted, federal courts will forever be referring back to
rules of a different legal era to govern modern problems for which those rules will only
fortuitously supply suitable answers."); Comment, supra note 9, at 498 n.23 (arguing
that reference to a pre-Erie general common law to justify an award of damages in
1965 is "incongruous").
In Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924 (1984), Justice Marshall described the §
1988 inquiry as one in which, after it is determined that federal law is not suitable,
courts should "consider[] [the] application of state 'common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes' of the forum state." Id. at 2929 (citing §
1988). He made this assertion without any reference to his opinions in Robertson v.
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589 n.5 (1978), or Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693, 703 (1973). Cf. Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611, 2616 (1983) ("Congress ha[s] plainly instructed the federal courts to refer to state law when federal law
provides no rule of decision . . . ."). Justice Powell has commented that he views §
1988 as codifying a "policy against invoking the federal common law except where
necessary to the vitality of a federal claim." Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 29 (1980)
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). And Justice Rehnquist has avoided the recognition of textual ambiguities by reading § 1988's command as mandating deference to
"the common law. . . of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held," Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 91 n.17 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting), omitting the words that render the reference to common law ambiguous, see
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) ("the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held") (emphasis added). Professor Theis's rejection of the Swift reading rests on his suggestion that § 1988 be simply disregarded in the interests of the
"'new' federal common law," see Theis, supra note 9, at 691, a suggestion that has not
been adopted.
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pears to support the view proposed here.
The crucial determination for the viability of the proposed reading
is the nature of the "common law" to which section 1988 mandated
reference in the absence of controlling federal statutory law.9" Although
Professor Fletcher has recently assured us that "in early nineteenth
century usage, 'common law' was a general common law shared by the
American states rather than a local common law of a particular
state,"9 " it appears that, at least by the middle of that century, courts
and commentators were well aware of the possibility of ambiguous usage and took cognizance of the possibility of a common law of each
individual state.99 The question of what the 1866 Congress intended by
the words "common law" simply cannot be answered by consulting the
contemporaneous plain meaning of the statute.
Neither do the relevant legislative materials resolve this question.
Although there is support for the "general common law" reading in the
directly applicable legislative history, other legislative materials lend
plausibility to a reading of the "common law" as that of the individual
states.
Referring to section 1988 in debate over the 1866 Civil Rights Act,
Congressman Kerr, in opposition to the bill, objected that
the things attempted to be prohibited are in themselves so
extraordinary and anomalous, so unlike anything ever attempted before by the Federal Government, that the authors
of this bill feared, very properly too, that the system of laws
heretofore administered in the Federal courts might fail to
supply any precedent to guide the courts in the enforcement
of the strange provisions of this bill, and not to be thwarted
by this difficulty, they confer upon the courts. . . the power
to make such other laws as they may think necessary. Such
" In answering this question, the recapitulation of the theoretical underpinnings
of Swift by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, see supra text accompanying note 87, is of
limited reliability. Erie is phrased as polemic rather than analysis, and the polemic is
directed against the doctrine as it existed in the early 20th century, rather than the
understanding of a Congress in 1871.
11 Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the JudiciaryAct of
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. RV. 1513, 1515 n.9 (1984).
" See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834) ("It is clear,
there can be no common law of the United States. The federal government is composed
of twenty-four sovereign and independent states; each of which may have its local usages, customs and common law."); see also 1 G. CURTIS, COMMENTARIES ON THE
JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND PECULIAR JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 19-20 (Philadelphia 1854) ("[W]hen a question depending upon a

common law right arises in the courts of the United States they must look to the law of
the states in which the controversy originates, or by the law of which the rights of the
parties are to be determined.").
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is the practical effect of [section 1988] ....
That is to say, the Federal courts may, in such cases,
make such rules and apply such law as they please, and call
it common law. 100
In Kerr's view the "common law" in question was a common law at
the mercy of federal interpretation, which was a reasonable prediction,
given recent developments under Swift. 101
Similarly, Senator Saulsbury, who opposed the enactment of the
1866 act, characterized the predecessor of section 1988 as obligating
courts "to render [their] decisions conformably to the common law as
modified by State law."1" 2 So, too, the marginal note in the official
version of the Statutes at Large that identifies section 1988 reads "Jurisdiction to be enforced according to the laws of the United States, or
the common law, &c."' 3 Reference to "the common law," standing
alone, has a strong flavor of a general common law. 0 4
By contrast, the report of the Revision of Statutes commission in
1872105 viewed the predecessor of section 1988 as an "anomalous provision," providing for "variable punishment" from state to state according
to local common law and hence open to "serious constitutional question." 0 6 Although there are reasons to discount this interpretation, 10 7 it
o00
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1271 (1866) (statement of Rep. Kerr).
See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
102 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 479 (1866) (statement of Sen. Saulsbury).
See also id. at 480 ("[A]s far as it can be done, the court shall conform to the common
law as modified by the laws of the State.").
103 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
104 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1680 (1866) (veto message of President Johnson, equating "the common law" with federal, not state, law). Although contemporaneous sources recognized he existence of state common law, I have not found
any use of "the common law" tout court, which refers to state common law rather than
a general common law. Cf.Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658-59 (1834)
("[W]e may inquire, whether the common law, as to copyrights, if any existed, was
adopted in Pennsylvania .... The judicial decisions, the usages and customs of the
respective states, must determine, how far the common law has been introduced and
sanctioned in each.").
105 In 1866 Congress appointed a commission to prepare a consolidation of the
statutes at large. The report of the commission in 1872 contained a draft of the Revised
Statutes that was rejected by Congress, and in 1873 work on the revision was transferred to the control of a joint committee of Congress. The committee's altered version
was introduced in December of 1873 and adopted in 1874. See I A. DONATH, CHECKLIST OF UNITED STATES PUBLIC DOCUMENTS 1789-1909, at 1524-25 (3d ed. 1911).
One of the few remaining copies of the 1872 draft is in the United States Supreme
Court library.
101

106 1 C. JAMES, B. ABBOT & V. BARRINGER, REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES
STATUTES AS DRAFTED BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED FOR THAT PURPOSE

421 (1872) (located in the United States Supreme Court Library) (copy on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review). The passage referred to in the text reads in
full:
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nonetheless lessens the force of any argument based on legislative history for interpreting "common law" as general common law.
Perhaps the best source of guidance in determining what Congress
intended when it enacted section 1988 is the functioning of the federal
jurisdiction already in existence at that time. In 1866 a general federal
question jurisdiction was still a decade in the future. Diversity jurisdiction, the major source of private federal cases, was the primary precedent for the functioning of the federal judiciary. Thus one might plausibly argue that, in conferring jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act
and the Ku Klux Klan Act, Congress used the diversity experience as a
model.10 And in 1866 the paradigm for federal diversity cases was
Swift.
Professor Eisenberg is dubious of references to Swift in construing
section 1988, in part because "Swift, even in its heyday, seemed only to
bless a federal common law of commerce."' 0 9 His factual premise, however, is almost certainly incorrect. Although early application of the
Swift doctrine was arguably limited to commercial matters, the province
of federally enunciated general law had expanded substantially beyond
those boundaries before the adoption of the precursors to sections 1988
and 1983."10

It seems to be the effect of this provision that, for the same offense against
civil rights, a variable punishment may be inflicted, according to the common law, as modified by statute, of the State where the offense is committed. The Government of the United States, being charged with the protection of these rights, is also charged with the duty of providing complete
and uniform rules of its own for that protection, and the replacement of
this anomalous provision by such rules may avert a serious constitutional
question.
.07Congress did not adopt the commissioners' report. Indeed, the scope of the
version finally included in the Revised Statutes was substantially broader than the commissioners' draft. Revised Statutes 722 as ultimately adopted governed habeas corpus,
all civil rights provisions, and the civil rights criminal provisions. The corresponding
section of the draft covered only the 1866 Civil Rights Act. This could indicate either a
disagreement with the suggestion that the statute, as interpreted by the commissioners,
was open to constitutional challenge on grounds of nonuniformity or a rejection of the
interpretation that read it as parasitic on state common law.
'08 See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 354 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("In an age when federal common law prevailed, [citing Swift], a Supreme Court decision would have been the natural focus for a Congress establishing a federal remedy
which was accompanied by a new grant of federal jurisdiction."); T. FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWifi & Erie CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 55
(1981).
.09 Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 513. Eisenberg's reference to Swift is made in the
context of his discussion of what constitutes deficient federal law. See supra note 94.
He also rejects the interpretation of "common law" as a general or federal common law
for still other reasons. See infra note 120.
110 See R. BRIDWELL & R. WITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON
LAW 3, 116, 139-41 (1977) (arguing that the application of the Swift principle to com-
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Discussions in contemporaneous treatises refer to no limitation of
the Swift doctrine to commercial law issues."' In the field of tort actions, the Court stated that "where private rights are to be determined
by the application of common law rules alone, this Court . . . does not
feel bound by [state] decisions." ' 2 And in 1866 the most recent and

outstanding application of the Swift principle was the Court's determination in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque"s that, in matters affecting municipal bonds, a federal diversity court was not bound by a state supreme court's interpretation of its own constitution. 4 In such an
mercial matters was correct as a conflict of laws principle, but recognizing that in the
latter part of the 19th century, by extending the Swift principle beyond commercial
cases, "[federal] judges . . . began to make law in a legislative fashion"); see also T.
FREYER, supra note 108, at 58-59.
"I"See, e.g., A. CONKLING, A TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION, JURISDICTION
AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 124-26 (4th ed. Albany
1864) (1st ed. Albany 1842); A. CONKLING, A TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION,
JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN SUITS AT
LAW 138-140 (5th ed. 1870); G. FIELD, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND
JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 431-32 n.1 (1883); G. HOLT,
THE CONCURRENT

JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL AND

STATE

COURTS

159-88

(1888) (setting forth 28 areas of litigation in which federally construed common law
differed from state laws governing rules of decision).
112 Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418, 428-29 (1862) (rejecting local rule
in case involving issue of respondeat superior). See also Dow v. Humbert, 91 U.S. 294
(1875) (in suit against town supervisors for negligently administering a creditor's execution, damages were determined by reference to New York and English cases, with no
reference made to any cases from the forum state); Parrot v. Wells Fargo & Co., 82
U.S. (15 Wall.) 524, 535-37 (1872) (using English cases and treatises as point of reference in setting standard of liability for negligence); Flanders v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 450, 453 (1872) (relying on a principle of general common law, Court declined
to award attorneys' fees in suit against United States customs official for wrongful
seizure); Transportation Co. v. Downer, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 129 (1870) (negligence
case citing no cases from forum state); Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497,
506 (1870) (distinguishing local rule from nuisance case at issue); Lincoln v. Claflin,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 132, 139 (1868) (in tort case, prejudgment interest awarded at discretion of jury; no forum state cases cited); Philadelphia, W. & B.R.R. v. Quigley, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 202, 213 (1859) (deciding liability of corporation in libel case according to general law of corporations); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 37172 (1851) (deciding issue of punitive damages in trespass case by reference to general
common law).
11
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1864).
114 Both modern commentators and contemporary opinion viewed Gelpcke, which
ultimately resulted in federal courts' overseeing the collection of municipal taxes to pay
the bonds, as a watershed in the expansion of federal court discretion under the Swift
principle. See R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, supra note 108, at 116-19 ("[Federal]
judges . . . began to make law in a legislative fashion, with the result that the sovereign authority of the states was ignored in an unconstitutional manner, and the expectations of the parties to many events was similarly defeated in a constitutionally impermissible fashion."); C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, PART ONE 919 (1971) ("The Court went
much further: enforcing bonds which the State court had held invalid without overruling any decision; construing state statutes-on the powers of municipal officers, on debt
limits, on the privileges of railroad corporations, etc.-contrary to the construction
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environment it seems unlikely that a reference to the common law
would require deference to local rules as a binding source of decision. A
more reasonable inference is that Congress intended to allow federal
courts in civil rights cases at least the same freedom that those courts
enjoyed in diversity cases. 15
Nonetheless, a mystery remains. If the governing interpretation of
the Rules of Decision Act under Swift would allow federal courts so
much discretion, why should Congress adopt an additional choice of
law statute to govern civil rights cases? The answer, I suggest, is that
the precise scope of the Swift doctrine at that time was, and was to
remain, unclear. In matters of local law, state rules governed; in matters of general law, federal courts were free to follow their own interpretations. And the boundary between local and general law was a
matter in substantial dispute."1 6
In such a climate, absent explicit congressional direction, newlyestablished causes of action for individuals seeking to vindicate their
civil rights might, in the view of states-rights advocates, be classed as
local.1 To avoid such a result, as well as to guarantee the application
of general law to removed cases, Congress provided that the common
law would be the primary source of law. Moreover, because the Swift
doctrine mandated deference to state statutes, regardless of whether the
given them by the State courts; and exercising unrestrainedly that independence in matters of 'general jurisprudence' .. . ."); T. FREYER, supra note 106, at 58-61; H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 77, at 366-67 ("The Court created, in effect, a new
dimension of general federal common law jurisdiction and jurisprudence. . . . Dissenting ... Justice Miller ...decried the federal encroachment upon the right of a state
court to speak finally upon the construction of its state Constitution and laws."); see
also C. FAIRMAN, supra, at 1010-1116 (describing subsequent developments in the
Gelpcke doctrine).
115 In fact, the earliest Supreme Court approach to the problem of filling in the
infrastructure of § 1983 actions, in Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897), looked to the
federal common law developed pursuant to Swift to determine the availability of punitive damages in a § 1983 action.
There is, of course, no way to refute the argument that congressional compromise
is inherently irrational and that, hence, irrational action vindicates the will of Congress,
ef. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 248-50 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (describing contradictions inherent in congressional adoption of Ku Klux Klan Act but arguing
for an interpretation consistent with the statute's contradictions). With respect to the
question of what the "common law" in § 1988 refers to, however, there seems to be no
history of compromise.
116 See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 53, at 349 ("The dichotomy between matters of 'general' law, which the federal courts were free to find for themselves, and
matters of 'local' law, on which state decisions were binding, proved particularly elusive."); Fletcher, supra note 98, at 1532-33 (describing the boundary between general
and local law as unclear and indistinct).
117 Cf Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 300-01 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (maintaining that it is within the state's province to raise and regulate its police force and
that acts of Congress cannot supersede these police powers).
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statutes conflicted with federal policy, Congress added the final inconsistency proviso." 8
III.

IMPLICATIONS

If I am right and section 1988 is properly to be read in light of
Swift v. Tyson," 9 it seems to me that there are two major implications
that the courts and civil rights litigators should heed. The first pertains
to the proper role of federal courts and the second to the role of state
law in civil rights litigation.

A.

The Development of a Federal Common Law in Civil Rights
Actions

In section 1983 litigation the system cannot function as Congress
originally intended. Federal courts have gone out of the business of
making general common law, and there is no contemporary body of
nationally uniform common law to fill in the gap. Given this fact, three
responses are possible, as long as the Supreme Court wishes to retain
section 1988 as an active piece of the enforcement system of civil rights
legislation. The Court may look to the pre-Erie federal common law; it
may look to the common law of the state that allegedly violated the
Constitution; or it may craft a new set of rules for section 1983
actions."'2
'18 There are two other historical points worthy of note. First, in 1866 an extensive federal equity jurisprudence existed, outside the purview of the Rules of Decision
Act. It seems likely that this would have been considered "federal law." See, e.g., Kirby
v. Lake Shore and Mich. S.R.R., 120 U.S. 130, 136 (1887). Thus the question in
Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S.Ct. 1970 (1984), whether a state judge is immune from injunctive actions, should have been answered by a nondeficient federal law.
Second, the Swift doctrine did not reach the question of the form of procedure
applicable in federal cases; these forms were consigned in the first instance to conformity with the state procedures of 1789. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1
(1825); C. WRIGHT, supra note 53, at 400-01. To the extent that Congress sought to
unify and modernize practice in civil rights cases, § 1988 may in part be characterized
as a predecessor of the Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
119 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
120 Professor Eisenberg does not find either of the first two choices "particularly
appealing," see Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 516-18, and his restrictive reading of the
words "common law" prevents him from ever giving a federal common law interpretation full consideration. He first assumes, in reliance on Supreme Court dictum from
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589-90 n.5 (1978), that any federal common
law would necessarily be pre-Erie common law. Although I certainly agree that reliance on such general common law would be problematic, I do not think that such
reliance is mandated if § 1988's "common law" is read the way that I suggest.
Second, Eisenberg asserts that in most cases, however interpreted, the "common
law" will be "modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State,"
Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 517-18 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (emphasis sup-
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Reliance on the pre-Erie common law would sacrifice the ability
of courts to mold civil rights jurisprudence in response to changing
times and values. There is no indication that Congress contemplated
such an ossified system, and its defects are manifest. 2 The rules forged
by common law courts of three and four generations past bear no necessary relation to modern problems. And, indeed, the lesson would not
be foreign to a Congress on the verge of replacing static with dynamic
conformity in federal procedure.
A focus on state common law would repudiate the congressional
intent to look to a uniform body of law as the infrastructure for civil
rights litigation. Such repudiation is hardly compelled by policy.
Whatever the merits of allowing state courts to determine the boundaries of causes of action created by their domestic law, the norm of equal
treatment suggests that identically injured plaintiffs should not be
treated differently in federal court on federal claims because of the vagaries of local law. The fourteenth amendment is as valuable in Utah
as it is in New York.
Nor are concerns of federalism vindicated by a state-to-state variation in the scope of federal remedies. Monroe v. Pape.2 2 tells us that
section 1983 is designed to supplement the remedies provided by state
law, not to mirror them.1 2 It is neither an infringement of state sovereignty nor an arrogation of judicial authority to suggest that state officials who violate federal constitutional rights have no claim to retain
state law immunities or to rely on state damage rules attuned to state
rather than federal interests. Moreover, the importance of providing a
clear set of guidelines for civil rights claimants suggests a federal interest in uniformity. Any search among state precedents for rules governing federal causes of action is likely to be a choice among parallels
of dubious salience. Today, in advance of a decision, there is no real
way for litigants to predict, for example, whether the state rules applicable to libel, negligence, or contract will be held to govern an action
for disparaging discharge without due process. A uniform federal rule
would make it less likely that federal rights will be forfeited by a plainplied by Eisenberg)), and that the majority of litigants will thus be unable to "escape
from the happenstance of state law." Id. at 517-18. The Court's treatment of the most
significant § 1983 issues-for example, immunities and damage calculations, see supra
notes 31-49 and accompanying text-belies this claim. In these cases it is in fact the
absence of state statutes that makes the nature of the "common law" in § 1988 crucial
to choosing the appropriate rule of law in § 1983 actions.
21 But see Hill, supra note 9, at 1154-55 (arguing that federal common law rules
from the Swift era are as suitable for use in constitutional litigation today as are the
many state rules and that these rules may be modified as present needs require).
122

365 U.S. 167 (1961).

122

See id. at 183.
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tiffs incorrect but plausible analogy to state practice.
Federal courts should naturally turn to the third route and undertake to establish a common law of civil rights actions. Such federal
common law loses the discipline that reference to a general common
law evolving in other areas would have imposed on the federal courts of
1866 and 1871. Nonetheless, the large number of current civil rights
cases suggests that federal courts will have ample opportunity to evolve
a structure of civil rights law on a case-by-case basis. Of the three options, this one seems the closest to what Congress originally intended,
and it is the one that best characterizes the Court's approach in recent
cases.
Under section 1988 the lack of a binding federal statute does not
mean that a court must survey the entire field of potentially applicable
state law. Section 1988 directs the federal courts in the first instance to
proceed as a matter of federal common law. State rules may be persuasive, but they are certainly not binding. And, similarly, the courts need
not be concerned with uncovering the arcana of nineteenth century tort
doctrine. The search is for the best current common law rule in light of
federal policies. Let us admit freely that federal courts can and do make
law in civil rights litigation. In making such law courts must remember
that, in adopting section 1988, Congress has not foresworn an interest
in national uniformity. Rather it has put its imprimatur on a federal
common law.
B.

The Significance of State Law

The second implication of my analysis is that federal courts cannot
ignore state law. Congress intended that the common law rule tentatively arrived at be modified by applicable state statutes; courts and
litigants must be on the lookout for these statutes. Although this modification is a considerably narrower constraint than a general rule of deference to state law, the proliferation of state statutes will generate escalating difficulties. 124 Courts will increasingly be faced with the problem
of classifying rules of mixed origin and addressing the impact of aging,
ambiguous, or obsolete statutory systems. In applying state statutes,
124 California's unusually comprehensive statutory code has generated several
clashes with the purposes of § 1983, and the Supreme Court has responded by refusing
to give effect to the statutory provisions. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284
(1980) (holding a California statute granting public officials absolute immunity with
respect to parole release determinations not applicable to § 1983 action even when the
action is brought in state court); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 698-710
(1973) (rejecting the application of California's vicarious liability statute that would
have imposed liability on a county, despite the fact that the statute was designed to
extend the protection of civil rights).

SECTION 1988

1985]

therefore, federal courts cannot be content with a simple literal reading.
Rather, the elaboration of the statute at issue must be sensitive both to
the construction state courts have given and are likely to give the statute
and to federal civil rights policies.
Indeed, this has been the Court's approach in its two most recent
ventures into the interpretation of section 1988. In Chardon v. Fumero
Soto 2 5 the Court approved the First Circuit's extrapolation of the way
in which a Puerto Rican court would mesh Puerto Rico's rules on class
actions and the tolling of statutes of limitations. Puerto Rico's tolling
rule, unlike most federal provisions, causes the statute of limitations to
begin running anew when the tolling event ceases. The Puerto Rican
class action procedure is modeled after Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Although the Puerto Rican courts had not addressed
the issue, the First Circuit concluded that, when a class action in a
federal court located in Puerto Rico is decertified, the Puerto Rican
rule applicable under section 1988 would cause the statute to begin
running anew for the benefit of the unnamed class plaintiffs. The Supreme Court approved this exegesis, despite the contrary federal common law rule adopted for antitrust cases in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah.126 As long as federal interests are not adversely
affected, even a tentative prediction of the state court's interpretation of
domestic statutory rules can function as the basis for statutory
determinations.
On the other hand, where state law provides a variety of statutory
analogies for the rule of decision question, a federal court should feel
free to choose the analogous provision that best serves federal interests.
The court should defer to the most appropriate state statutory analogy,
bearing in mind that "[a] state law is not 'appropriate' if it fails to take
into account practicalities that are involved in litigating federal civil
rights claims and policies that are analogous to the goals of the Civil
2s the Supreme Court
Rights Acts."' 12 7 Thus, in Burnett v. Grattan,1
held that a section 1983 action for employment discrimination was to
be governed by the three-year residual state statute of limitations rather
than the six-month statute of limitations for the filing of administrative
complaints with the state equal employment agency. The Court reasoned that the three-year statute better furthered the goals of section
1983:
125
126
127
128

103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983).
414 U.S. 538 (1974).
Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2930 (1984).
104 S. Ct. 2924 (1984).
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To the extent that particular state concerns are inconsistent
with, or of marginal relevance to, the policies informing the
Civil Rights Act, the resulting state statute of limitations
may be inappropriate for civil rights claims.
The divergence between the goals of the federal civil
rights statutes and of the state employment discrimination
administrative statute is clear in the present case.129
This process of construing state statutes consistently with federal interests was, by 1871, a regular feature of the Swift regime,' 3 0 and it is a
reasonable concomitant of the interpretation of section 1988 advanced
above.
Finally, whatever alterations state statutes make in the underlying
federal rule must still be measured against the policies of federal legislation. States cannot immunize themselves from section 1983 actions by
passing statutes to that effect,' and federal courts should be reluctant
to allow restrictive procedural prerequisites to accomplish the same
thing by less direct measures."3 2 Application of state law must be contingent on the full availability of the federal remedy.
Nonetheless, in most situations, it is not inconsistent with the policies underlying section 1983 for a state statute to impose a higher level
33
of responsibility or damages than is available under federal law.1
State statutes that augment the effectiveness of the section 1983 remedy
may not be immediately obvious, but courts and counsel should be alert
for their existence.
CONCLUSION

I realize that there is something anachronistic, perhaps antiquarian, in bottoming modern statutory interpretation on a case that has
been overruled for almost half a century. Nonetheless, the elaboration
129

Id. at 2931 (citations omitted).

See Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 206-07 (1864); supra
note 115.
131 See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980).
iSI See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 742 F.2d 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(statutory requirement of notification within six months should not be applied under §
1988); McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907, 911 (2d Cir.) (state survival statute limiting remedies under § 1983 for unconstitutional conduct resulting in death is "inconsistent" with federal law), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 394 (1983); Knoll v. Springfield
Township School Dist., 699 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1983) (rejecting state's six-month
statute of limitations), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 3571 (1984); Johnson v. Davis, 582
F.2d 1316, 1317 (4th Cir. 1978) (rejecting state's special short statute of limitations for
§ 1983 actions).
133 Cf. Chardon, 103 S. Ct. at 2618-19 n.15.
1.0
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of section 1983 is an anachronistic enterprise. The statute was originally adopted over a century ago, and, because it languished unused
until its 1961 resurrection in Monroe v. Pape,13 4 there is no history of
continuous interpretation to link today's perceptions of section 1983 to
those of the statute's framers. Indeed, these many years of inactivity
prompted one of Justice Frankfurter's objections to the revival of section 1983 in Monroe: "We cannot expect to create an effective means of
protection for human liberties by torturing an 1871 statute to meet the
problems of 1960. '' 135
If the interpretation advanced in this essay is valid, no torture is
necessary. The 1871 Congress itself manifested a preference for the
common law power of federal courts to adjust the framework of the law
to meet the problems of the changing society. To take that preference at
face value allows us to justify the otherwise unsupported but sensible
approach that the Court has largely adopted toward elaboration of section 1983 in the last decade. It permits courts to direct civil rights practitioners in most instances to a single and uniform body of precedents
from which to seek guidance. The proposed interpretation provides a
basis for elevating contemporary policy concerns above both the fruitless search for direct legislative evidence of specific remedial intentions
and the interminable excavation of fossilized contemporaneous tort law.
It is, I submit, preferable to either willfully ignoring an apparently
applicable statute or finding oneself adrift in a raging sea of state law.
Until Congress decides to remedy the predicament,"3 6 it is the best we
can do.

a 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
Id. at 244 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
136 In the antitrust area, for example, Congress has provided for a statute of limitations period for bringing an action, see 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982), as well as rules for
the tolling of the limitations period and the effect of such tolling, see id. § 16(i). See
also Chardon v. Fumero, 103 S. Ct. 2611, 2617 nn.11 & 12 (1983).
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